{"id":4748,"date":"2025-12-19T20:36:01","date_gmt":"2025-12-19T20:36:01","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/jakubieciwspolnicy.pl\/?p=4748"},"modified":"2025-12-20T06:12:50","modified_gmt":"2025-12-20T06:12:50","slug":"what-does-j-mearsheimer-teach-us-about-shareholders-conflicts","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/jakubieciwspolnicy.pl\/en\/what-does-j-mearsheimer-teach-us-about-shareholders-conflicts\/","title":{"rendered":"What Does J. Mearsheimer Teach Us About Shareholders Conflicts?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n



From the beginning of my work as a business attorney, I observed a striking pattern. In companies with three partners, disputes arose more frequently than in firms with two or four partners. For a long time, I treated this as an interesting curiosity. That changed after I read John Mearsheimer\u2019s<\/strong>\u00a0The Tragedy of Great Power Politics<\/em>. Why three-partner companies are statistically more prone to disputes?<\/strong> International political theories offer surprising insights into modern business partnerships. Specifically, Mearsheimer\u2019s theory of offensive realism may explain why three-person structures face inherent instability. By understanding these structural dynamics, entrepreneurs can defuse conflicts before they destroy company value.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

International Relations Theory in Business<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Is instability of three-partner companies real? Business analysis often draws on theories originally developed to explain great-power politics. John Mearsheimer\u2019s seminal work,\u00a0The Tragedy of Great Power Politics<\/em>, presents a clear thesis. He says, that bipolar systems, consisting of two main actors, are significantly more stable than multipolar ones.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In a business context, this translates into the relative durability of companies with only two partners. In such a setup, each partner typically holds a clearly defined role and maintains a strong incentive to reach an agreement to ensure the venture’s survival.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Third Partner as a Structural Risk Factor<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Once a third partner is introduced, the situation becomes strategically complex. Over time, the third individual naturally begins to assess their relative position within the company hierarchy. Neutral events or private conversations may be misinterpreted as signs of a growing alignment between the other two, leading to a breakdown in trust.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As questions arise about the sense of further investing energy, trust, and capital, perceptions begin to shift. This change can radically alter internal loyalty and decision-making dynamics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Can Mearsheimer\u2019s Theory Explain Shareholder Conflicts?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

But can a theory about nuclear powers really apply to a three-person tech startup? The short answer: surprisingly well. The issue is whether they can be used to analyze relationships between business partners. To begin, let us lay out his core arguments. These are:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mearsheimer\u2019s key arguments about why multipolar arrangements are unstable:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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  1. Anarchy in the system<\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 There is no central authority to enforce agreements or reassure participants. Each actor must rely on itself for security. This creates constant pressure to accumulate advantage and undermines stable trust.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  2. Offensive capabilities<\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 All major actors possess power that can be used against others. This creates persistent incentives to increase power rather than rely on cooperation.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  3. Uncertainty about others\u2019 intentions<\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 Actors can never be fully certain about others\u2019 motivations or future plans. As a result, they make worst-case assumptions that drive competitive behavior.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  4. Survival as the primary goal<\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 Fear of being outcompeted or dominated shapes strategic behavior. Players seek relative advantage even at the cost of short-term cooperation.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  5. Power maximization behaviour<\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 Actors do not stop seeking power once basic security is achieved. They continue accumulating power to prevent rivals from gaining advantage.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  6. Security competition becomes self-reinforcing<\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 When one actor increases power, others respond in kind. This dynamic fuels escalation rather than long-term stability.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  7. Greater opportunities for miscalculation<\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 Multipolar settings create shifting alliances and imbalances. These conditions increase the risk of misjudging intentions or capabilities, triggering conflict.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n

    These assumptions and behavioral imperatives form the core of Mearsheimer\u2019s\u00a0offensive realism<\/em>\u00a0perspective.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Doesn\u2019t this list sound\u00a0eerily familiar<\/em>?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

    When we consider interpersonal dynamics in small, closed settings like commercial partnerships, this list stops being abstract. Competing for relative advantage and mistrusting intentions often feels natural in tightly knit management groups. The same logic appears in global geopolitical systems.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    If we consider the theoretical basis for such a conceptual transfer, it cannot be dismissed outright. At minimum, it functions as a legitimate intellectual exercise rather than a formal scientific claim. This framing is a thought experiment, not a strict scientific argument. Still, the parallels are striking and, I hope, clear.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The Security Dilemma at the Micro Level<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

    This internal tension closely resembles the \u201csecurity dilemma\u201d applied on a micro scale. In this scenario, an increase in one party\u2019s sense of security or influence triggers an instinctive fear in the others. Consequently, a partner may seek to weaken the rest of the group simply to strengthen their own position.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The desire to assume a destructive role\u2014such as an informal judge or arbiter\u2014often emerges. Historical precedents, such as the Roman triumvirates or the history of successor kingdoms following Charlemagne\u2019s empire, confirm that these three-way arrangements are rarely durable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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    In my mediation and advisory practice, conflicts in three-partner companies tend to escalate faster and more emotionally than in two-partner structures.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

    Strategic Consequences for the Company<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

    Conflict escalation in a trio is usually faster and more destructive than in other configurations. As decision-making paralysis begins to erode the organization from within, partners often find themselves fighting each other more fiercely than they compete with the market.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Because you know your partners best, you are able to strike at their most sensitive points. Ultimately, vital energy is diverted into building internal coalitions instead of driving growth.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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    In real corporate disputes, this dynamic frequently leads to board paralysis, operational stagnation, or costly shareholder litigation.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

    Instability of three-partner companies. Why Three-Person Structures Are Worth Avoiding?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

    Companies with three partners are among the least stable business forms because the potential for unequal alliances\u2014typically two versus one\u2014is embedded in the very structure. Instead of creating synergy, the system often devolves into a continuous zero-sum game.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    If you are planning a new company, a two-partner model is usually a safer strategic choice. Reading Mearsheimer is essential for any leader who wants to understand and mitigate these structural risks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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    Scientific Foundations: Conflict Dynamics in Triads<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

    To fully understand the risks, one must examine the mathematical and psychological frameworks governing three-party interactions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Offensive Realism in Systems Without a Central Arbiter<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

    A company\u2019s management board often resembles an “anarchic” system. Without a dominant leader to enforce order, each actor must maximize their own power to ensure survival. In a triad, this logic produces a cycle of constant alliance reshuffling.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The Sociology of the Triad (Georg Simmel)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

    According to Georg Simmel, introducing a third person fundamentally changes group chemistry. Three distinct roles typically emerge: the mediator, the opportunist (tertius gaudens<\/em>), and the dominator. This structural shift transforms simple cooperation into a complex struggle for influence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The Physics of Intractable Conflicts<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

    Modern sociophysical models suggest that three-group dynamics are inherently unstable. The human mind is wired to perceive coalition threats more acutely in triads, which often triggers defensive aggression and long-term instability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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    Instability of three-partner companies. Key Sources on Three-Party Conflict Dynamics<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

    The following materials provide a foundation for deeper risk analysis in three-partner companies:<\/p>\n\n\n\n