
Why Intelligent People Lose Disputes?
Litigation as a Subplot: Viewing the Court Case Within a Broader Conflict
A lawsuit is almost always just a single element of a much larger conflict. The real dispute—the one that exists independently of the courtroom—is often far broader than what the court actually addresses. It can involve a wider network of people, stem from historical tensions, or even generate entirely new disputes. Consequently, legal proceedings are usually just one of many battlegrounds—and frequently not the most critical one.
This dynamic is especially clear in corporate warfare. A shareholder often challenges a board resolution not because it is defective, but because blocking it stalls a hostile takeover or strengthens their bargaining power. The court is left analyzing arguments manufactured solely for the trial, which have little to do with the actual core of the dispute.
To bring structure to this chaos, let us recognize three distinct dimensions of conflict:
- 1. The Substantive – Real Conflict — what the battle is actually about.
- 2. The Perceptual Conflict — how each party subjectively views the situation.
- 3. The Legal / Procedural Conflict — what formally makes its way into the courtroom.
- Dynamic interaction between the three dimensions of conflict:

A single legal proceeding is often just one clash among many between the same or interconnected parties. The conflict simultaneously rages across other fronts: operational, communicative, reputational, familial, or financial.
Crucially, both sides can view the position of a given lawsuit on the “conflict map” entirely differently. The upper hand goes to the party whose map reflects reality more accurately—yet the perception of each actor is, at the same time, a structural element of that very reality.
Therefore, it is vital to remember: you can win the case and lose the conflict. You can also lose the case and achieve all your strategic goals. Even highly intelligent people routinely blind themselves to this distinction. It is a fatal error committed by corporate strategists, politicians, military commanders, lawyers, advisors, entrepreneurs, and spouses in crisis alike.
To illustrate this, let me share an example. I once handled a case involving two brothers who were partners in a limited liability company (sp. z o.o.). One of them maliciously blocked the other’s dividend payout, fully aware that his brother desperately needed the cash. The case went to a commercial court. Armies of lawyers, forensic accountants, and business valuation experts were brought in. Over time, it turned out that the brothers had simply had a massive falling out over who was supposed to host Christmas Eve dinner. The court could have litigated for ten years without ever touching the true essence of the dispute. Any formal judgment would have only deepened their conflict.
Redefining Victory: What Does It Actually Mean to “Win”?
What, then, constitutes victory? It is certainly not the mere act of winning a court case. If Pyrrhus had been a lawyer, he would have agreed with me without hesitation. For anyone interested in this subject, I highly recommend Thomas Schelling’s brilliant book, The Strategy of Conflict.
While I have presented a detailed exploration of how winning and losing are defined in a separate article, I will limit myself here to the most common understandings of victory. In practice, they can be divided into four distinct categories:
1. Absolute Victory — Achieving Personal Objectives
- You win if you achieve your original, baseline plans.
- You win if, post-dispute, you retain more options and opportunities to pursue your core interests.
- You win if you incur lower reputational costs.
2. Relational Victory — Outcome Relative to the Opponent
- You win if you defeat the opponent in a direct, head-to-head confrontation.
- You win if you extract more benefit than the other side.
- You win if you inflict heavier losses on the opponent than you sustain yourself.
- You win if you drive the exhaustion of the opponent’s resources.
- You win if you permanently prevent the opponent from achieving their core interests in the long run.
3. Perceptual Victory — Narrative and Reception
- You win if you subjectively perceive yourself as the winner.
- You win if your opponent perceives you as the winner.
- You win if external observers perceive you as the winner.
4. Strategic Victory — Post-Dispute Position
- You win if your relative position improves more significantly: a) compared to your baseline position, b) compared to the opponent’s baseline position, or c) compared to the opponent’s subsequent, post-dispute position.
As we can see, a single legal proceeding rarely guarantees victory in any of these categories. The court rules only on a single fragment of reality—and not necessarily the one that matters most to the parties involved. In divorce, corporate, or asset disputes, a court may decide a crucial matter, but just as often, it touches upon only one of many threads, completely disconnected from what determines a real win or loss.
Furthermore, the outcome of a dispute can be evaluated entirely differently by various individuals. This divergence typically stems from:
- The application of different criteria for success;
- Access to asymmetrical information; or
- Discrepancies in the time horizon through which the consequences are viewed.
The Real Reason Why Smart People Fail
This is exactly why intelligent people lose so often. Driven by sheer determination, they execute actions that:
- Either cannot logically lead to their intended goal,
- Or the goal itself was defined incorrectly and fails to improve their overall position,
- Or they concentrate heavily on the least significant aspect—such as a relational victory (the need to be deemed the winner), which in practice yields a profound strategic defeat.
Yet, this very discrepancy can be useful. It allows parties to save face—which is frequently the ultimate psychological prerequisite for accepting a factual defeat.

The Anatomy of Failure: Why Smart People Lose in Court
Failure stems from various causes. However, before we dissect them, it is worth noting something crucial: not all failure is inherently bad. Sometimes, a loss closes a flawed alternative and forces a course of action that proves highly beneficial in the long run. Certain failures function merely as a system correction mechanism—painful, yet necessary.
However, if we want to understand why highly intelligent people fail, we must map the root causes of failure across the three dimensions of conflict: the real, the perceptual, and the legal. Most importantly, we must expose the specific errors characteristic precisely of intelligent individuals.
Table: Why Highly Intelligent People Fail Across the Three Dimensions of Conflict?
| Dimension of Conflict | Specific Failure Pattern | Why Smart People Are Especially Vulnerable |
|---|---|---|
| Real Conflict | Overconfidence | Intelligent individuals overestimate their ability to predict the behavior, intentions, and thresholds of other actors. |
| Real Conflict | Illusion of Completeness | They construct coherent, elegant narratives from incomplete data because their minds refuse informational gaps. |
| Real Conflict | Elegance Bias | They prefer intellectually satisfying solutions over those that are operationally effective. |
| Real Conflict | Planning Fallacy | They underestimate time, cost, friction, and opponent counter‑moves due to excessive trust in their own planning ability. |
| Perceptual Conflict | Narrative Capture | They become prisoners of their own internally coherent story, which eventually outweighs the actual facts. |
| Perceptual Conflict | Confirmation Bias 2.0 | They do not merely seek confirmation — they actively engineer it through sophisticated rationalization. |
| Perceptual Conflict | Self‑Justification | Their intelligence makes it harder to admit misjudgment, leading to escalation rather than correction. |
| Perceptual Conflict | Misreading the Audience | They overestimate how much others care about the conflict, misjudge stakeholder investment, and misread reputational stakes. |
| Legal Conflict | Legal Tunnel Vision | They equate legal correctness with strategic victory, misunderstanding the limited role of law in a dynamic conflict. |
| Legal Conflict | Overengineering Arguments | They overcomplicate and over‑refine arguments, losing sight of what actually persuades a judge. |
| Legal Conflict | Misreading the System | They treat the court as a logical machine rather than a human institution with its own constraints and dynamics. |
| Legal Conflict | Cost Blindness | Convinced of the righteousness of their cause, they ignore financial, emotional, reputational, and temporal costs. |
1. Real Conflict — Flaws in Reality Among Intelligent Minds
It is at this foundational level that intelligence most frequently becomes a trap. This is not because smart people think poorly, but rather because they think too well, and their minds refuse to tolerate ambiguity.
- 1.1. Overconfidence — Overestimating Predictive Capabilities Intelligent people deeply believe they can accurately predict the behavior of other participants in a conflict. This illusion invariably leads to flawed strategic choices.
- 1.2. Illusion of Completeness — Constructing Coherent Narratives from Incomplete Data The smarter an individual is, the more effortlessly they craft beautiful, logical explanations to fill information gaps. The problem is that these narratives, while intensely compelling, are often entirely false.
- 1.3. Elegance Bias — Choosing Elegant Solutions Over Effective Ones Intelligent people have a strong tendency to select courses of action that are logical, aesthetic, and intellectually satisfying—yet do not necessarily work in practice. In litigation, elegant solutions often take the form of sophisticated, academic legal theories, while effective solutions are frequently simple, raw, and tactical.
- 1.4. Planning Fallacy — Underestimating Time, Costs, and Friction The more someone trusts their own planning capability, the more they blind themselves to random variables, procedural delays, opponent counter-moves, and collateral costs. This is a direct path to strategic disasters.
2. Perceptual Conflict — Flaws in Narrative Among Intelligent Minds
This is the most elusive and treacherous plane. Here, intelligence transforms into the ultimate trap, inadvertently triggering a dangerous spiral of escalation.
- 2.1. Narrative Capture — Becoming a Prisoner of One’s Own Story The more intelligent an individual is, the more easily they manufacture an internal narrative that perfectly justifies their decisions, explains the opponent’s moves, and imposes order onto chaos. Eventually, this narrative becomes more vital to them than the actual facts.
- 2.2. Confirmation Bias 2.0 — Intelligent Rationalization Smart people do not merely seek confirmation for their assumptions; they actively engineer it, brilliant at rationalizing reality to fit their preconceived thesis.
- 2.3. Self-Justification — Defending the Ego The higher the intelligence, the harder it is to admit a miscalculation—to acknowledge a misread situation, a poorly chosen objective, or a failure of one’s own making. Prioritizing ego over core interests always accelerates escalation.
- 2.4. Misreading the Audience — Flawed Stakeholder Assessment Intelligent individuals frequently overestimate how deeply external parties care about the conflict, how heavily invested the opponent truly is, or how severely their own reputation is at stake. Consequently, they deploy defensive tactics that serve no strategic purpose.
3. Legal (Court) Conflict — Flaws in Procedure Among Intelligent Minds
This is the arena where intelligent people believe most blindly in the power of their intellect. Paradoxically, it is precisely why they suffer their most devastating defeats here.
- 3.1. Legal Tunnel Vision — Equating Legal Correctness with Strategic Victory A classic delusion: assuming that if you have the law on your side, if your argument is crystal-clear in its logic, and if the statutes support you, you must win. In reality, strict legal correctness is often strategically useless. The most dangerous error is not misunderstanding the law itself; it is misunderstanding the limited role that law plays within a larger, dynamic conflict.
- 3.2. Overengineering Arguments The smarter the individual, the more they complicate, over-expand, and refine their arguments, completely losing sight of the simple, raw points that actually persuade a judge.
- 3.3. Misreading the System — Treating the Court as a Logical Machine Intelligent people often refuse to accept that the court does not operate like their own mind, that legal procedure is not a purely intellectual tool, and that a judge is rarely an audience for idealized, academic discourse.
- 3.4. Cost Blindness — Ignoring Collateral Damage Blinded by the righteousness of their cause, smart individuals stop calculating real transactional costs: financial depletion, emotional fatigue, reputational hits, and the immense cost of lost time.
Failure’s Anatomy Summary
The Anatomy of Failure: A strategic mapping of the 12 behavioral and procedural traps that lead high-IQ individuals and enterprises to catastrophic defeats across the real, perceptual, and legal dimensions of conflict.

Highly intelligent people do not lose because they lack capability; they lose because they become overconfident in the products of their own thinking. They construct logical, elegant models of conflict that work perfectly in their heads but disintegrate in reality. They spin narratives that protect their ego rather than their enterprise. In court, they focus obsessively on legal victory while remaining entirely blind to strategic defeat.
To win, one must first accept that the real, perceptual, and legal systems operate by an entirely different set of rules than those dictated by our own intelligence. Smart people often hire lawyers who resemble themselves — analytical, academic, theoretical — instead of those who actually win trials.
Shifting the Odds: How to Increase Your Chances of Winning
To provide a meaningful answer to how one can increase the chances of winning, we must maintain our core distinction between the three dimensions of conflict. Addressing this question within the Real and Perceptual dimensions—where battles involve complex psychological warfare, market dynamics, and reputational chess—is far too vast a subject for this chapter. Therefore, I will deliberately set those two layers aside for now and focus exclusively on the tactical mechanics of the Legal (Court) Conflict, specifically within the unique and challenging reality of the Polish judicial system.
In Polish litigation, raw intelligence and a sense of moral entitlement are rarely enough. To navigate the procedural rigidity and systemic unpredictability of Polish courts, a smart strategist must adhere to nine fundamental principles:
1. Enter the Courtroom Only When Absolutely Necessary
The Polish judicial system is notoriously overburdened, slow, and formalistic. Litigation should never be your first impulse; it must be your last resort. Treat the decision to file a lawsuit like a declaration of war—an expensive, exhausting measure deployed only when all alternative strategic options, leverage points, and non-judicial mechanisms have been completely exhausted.
2. Master Both the Facts and the Legal Interpretation
Polish civil and commercial procedures are deeply unforgiving of preparation gaps. You must achieve absolute command over two fronts before the first gavel falls:
- The Evidentiary Base: Establish an airtight, chronological map of undeniable facts supported by robust documentary evidence.
- The Legal Theory: Secure a bulletproof, precise interpretation of the law. In a system where precedents are persuasive but not strictly binding, your legal framework must leave no room for arbitrary interpretation.
3. Rigorously Account for Judicial Risk (Ryzyko Procesowe)
In Poland, “judicial risk” is a structural reality. Different senates or divisions within the exact same court can interpret identical regulations in wildly contrasting ways. Never plan for a best-case scenario. A brilliant strategist calculates the probability of systemic inconsistency, unexpected changes in jurisprudence, and the subjective disposition of the adjudicating judge. If your strategy cannot survive a hostile or unpredictable judicial turn, it is a bad strategy.
4. Select a Top-Tier Trial Advocate
Do not hire an academic or a theorist for a street fight. You need an experienced, highly tactical litigator (adwokat or radca prawny) who understands the gritty reality of Polish courtrooms. A great advocate does not just know the codes; they know how to read the judge, how to react dynamically to unexpected procedural maneuvers by the opponent, and how to deliver surefire, persuasive arguments under extreme time pressure.
5. Secure the Capital Required to Sustain the Siege
Litigation in Poland is rarely a blitzkrieg; it is almost always a war of attrition. Between the initial filing, the exchange of extensive pleadings, delays in scheduling hearings, and the inevitable appellate process, a case can easily drag on for years. You must secure and isolate the necessary financial resources upfront. Entering a legal dispute with a tight budget is a fatal vulnerability; running out of capital midway through a trial forces catastrophic settlements.
6. Construct Razor-Sharp Evidentiary Hypotheses (Tezy Dowodowe)
Under current Polish procedural law, preclusion rules are exceptionally strict. You cannot simply throw a mountain of documents at a judge and hope they find the truth. Every single piece of evidence, every witness, and every expert report must be accompanied by a meticulously drafted, precise evidentiary hypothesis (teza dowodowa). You must clearly state exactly what a specific piece of evidence proves and why it is legally relevant to the core layout of the case. Loose, vague motions will be ruthlessly dismissed by the court.
7. Never Treat the Trial as an End in Itself
The courtroom is not a theater for personal vindication or academic debates. A lawsuit is merely a highly specialized instrument within your broader business or personal framework. Always keep your eyes on the ultimate strategic outcome. If a specific procedural victory does not improve your real-world position, protect your assets, or open up new opportunities, it is an expensive distraction. Never sacrifice your enterprise to win a point of law.
8. Remember that Witnesses and Court Experts Are Only Human
Smart people often expect the court to behave like a flawless, data-driven machine, but it is staffed entirely by human beings.
- Witnesses are deeply unreliable: they forget crucial details over time, perceive events through biased lenses, get confused under cross-examination, or cave under psychological pressure.
- Court-Appointed Experts (Biegli Sądowi)—who carry immense weight in Polish litigation—are also susceptible to human flaws. They can be overworked, deliver superficial or deeply flawed opinions, succumb to professional inertia, or struggle to grasp highly modern business models. Your strategy must always build in a margin of safety for human error and cognitive bias.
9. Run Parallel Negotiations — The Courtroom Door Is Never Locked
A highly sophisticated strategist understands that litigation and negotiation are not mutually exclusive; they are complementary tracks. The fact that you are fighting fiercely inside the courtroom should never stop you from talking outside of it. Parallel negotiations can run continuously, addressing not only the narrow legal dispute itself but also all the broader, structural elements of the conflict that the court is legally blind to. Quite often, a well-executed, aggressive lawsuit is the exact catalyst needed to force a stubborn opponent into a highly favorable settlement.
Litigation is never the battlefield — it is only the visible fragment of a much larger strategic landscape.
Table: Nine Principles for Increasing Your Chances of Winning in Polish Litigation
| Principle | Core Idea | Strategic Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Enter the Courtroom Only When Necessary | Litigation must be a last resort, not a first impulse. | Polish courts are slow, overloaded, and formalistic; premature litigation destroys leverage and drains resources. |
| Master Facts and Legal Interpretation | Achieve total command over evidence and legal theory. | Polish procedure punishes gaps; only airtight facts + precise legal framing survive judicial scrutiny. |
| Account for Judicial Risk | Build a strategy that survives inconsistent jurisprudence. | Identical cases can be decided differently; planning for unpredictability is mandatory. |
| Select a Top‑Tier Trial Advocate | Choose a tactical litigator, not an academic. | Winning requires courtroom instincts, judge‑reading, and rapid tactical adaptation. |
| Secure Litigation Capital | Prepare financial reserves for a multi‑year siege. | Running out of funds mid‑trial forces catastrophic settlements and strategic collapse. |
| Construct Razor‑Sharp Evidentiary Hypotheses | Every piece of evidence must have a precise, articulated purpose. | Strict preclusion rules eliminate vague motions; only targeted evidence survives. |
| Never Treat the Trial as an End in Itself | Court victories matter only if they improve real‑world position. | Procedural wins without strategic value are expensive distractions. |
| Expect Human Fallibility | Witnesses and experts are unreliable, biased, and inconsistent. | Polish courts rely heavily on human testimony and expert opinions — both structurally fallible. |
| Run Parallel Negotiations | Litigate and negotiate simultaneously. | Court pressure often unlocks settlements; negotiations address dimensions the court cannot see. |
Conclusion
Winning in the legal arena demands far more than raw intelligence or an airtight legal argument. As we have dissected, high-IQ individuals and sophisticated corporate actors routinely suffer catastrophic defeats not from a lack of capability, but because they fall prey to their own cognitive biases—becoming captive to elegant models, misreading human fallibility, and confusing strict legal correctness with overarching strategic victory.
Ultimately, a court case is never a standalone battle; it is merely a single subplot within a much larger, dynamic conflict. To tilt the scales in your favor—especially within the rigid and unpredictable landscape of Polish litigation—you must discipline your mind to look beyond the courtroom doors. You must balance aggressive procedural tactics with cold, objective reality, recognize the human limitations of the system, and never stop negotiating outside the courtroom. True victory belongs to those who refuse to let their ego dictate their strategy, and who understand that the ultimate goal is not merely to win a point of law, but to protect and advance their real-world enterprise.
Call to Action
When the stakes are high, you cannot afford to rely on legal correctness alone. If your enterprise is facing a complex corporate, commercial, or asset dispute, you need more than just a firm that files pleadings—you need a partner who maps the entire conflict.
Let us dissect the reality of your dispute before the system dissects it for you.
Contact Jakubiec i Wspólnicy today to schedule a strategic consultation. Together, we will look beyond the legal subplot, neutralize cognitive traps, and engineer a path to real, strategic victory.
FAQ
Q1: If I have a 90% chance of winning a case legally, shouldn’t I push forward to a judgment?
A: Legally, yes; strategically, it depends entirely on what that judgment will cost you in the Real and Perceptualdimensions of the conflict. In Polish commercial disputes, a multi-year trial can drain your management’s time, exhaust financial resources, and paralyze business operations. If a 90% legal victory results in a 100% reputational disaster or leaves your enterprise financially depleted, it is a net strategic defeat. Always weigh the transaction costs against the real-world value of the judgment.
Q2: Why does high intelligence make corporate leaders more vulnerable to legal traps?
A: High intelligence is an asset, but without behavioral discipline, it breeds Overconfidence and Elegance Bias. Brilliant minds refuse informational gaps, so they construct beautifully logical, internally coherent narratives (Illusion of Completeness) that explain the conflict perfectly—in their heads. They often fall in love with sophisticated legal theories rather than simple, raw, tactical moves. They lose because they become captive to the perfection of their own models, failing to realize that the courtroom is a human institution, not a logical machine.
Q3: How do you negotiate with an opponent while simultaneously fighting them fiercely in court?
A: By treating litigation not as an emotional vendetta, but as a dynamic leverage generator. Filing a precise, aggressive lawsuit changes the opponent’s calculus, escalates their Cost Blindness, and directly attacks their Perceptual stability. You do not negotiate out of weakness; you use the procedural pressure created inside the courtroom as the exact catalyst to force a rational, structured conversation outside of it. The courtroom door is never locked.
Q4: Court-appointed experts (Biegli sądowi) are professionals. Why do you label them as a systemic risk?
A: Because they are human beings operating within a heavily burdened system. In Polish litigation, experts carry immense structural weight, yet they frequently suffer from professional inertia, severe overwork, or a lack of familiarity with highly modern, fast-paced business models. An expert can misread data, deliver a superficial report, or succumb to cognitive bias. A sophisticated legal strategy must always factor in this margin for human error and include targeted, razor-sharp evidentiary hypotheses to steer the expert’s focus precisely.
Q5: What is the difference between winning a “case” and winning a “conflict”?
A: A court case is merely a highly formalistic subplot. Winning a case means obtaining a favorable ruling on a specific, narrow legal claim (e.g., overturning a corporate resolution or enforcing a single contractual clause). Winning a conflictmeans protecting your long-term baseline, expanding your future strategic options, and advancing your core enterprise interests. If your legal victory does not improve your real-world position, you have simply mastered the procedure while failing the strategy.

Cognitive Traps and Their Impact on Decision‑Making in the Fogg Model
In several previous texts, I presented some cognitive biases (thinking traps), including the fundamental attribution error, tunnel vision, and my original concept of the Coupled Confirmation Bias. I wrote about them mainly in the context of their impact on the dynamics of conflict, which I observe in my daily work. Now I want to take a step further and show how these same mechanisms influence the decision‑making process in the Fogg model.
To move forward, I introduce a set of tools I’ve developed myself — three decision’s parameters and eight resulting decision types. In the next section, I walk through how these elements interact and why they matter. This framework is entirely my own creation; I find it promising and intuitively useful, though it still needs to be tested in practice. For now, it remains a proposal — and I state that openly.
What Are Cognitive Biases?
Cognitive biases are, in other words, errors or traps in thinking. The term was popularized by Daniel Kahneman. This outstanding psychologist published the book Thinking, Fast and Slow, in which he described mechanisms that affect all of us. Not because something is wrong with us. These mechanisms serve important functions. They simplify many matters. They allow us, for example, to conserve energy or solve a given problem well enough to move on to the next one.
But in complex social relationships, they cause us to misjudge reality, create false narratives in our minds, and ultimately make poor decisions.
Which Cognitive Biases Do We Know?
There are many cognitive biases, and we have probably not discovered all of them yet. Here I will briefly present only a few:
- Confirmation bias
- Fundamental Attribution Error
- Status quo bias
- Sunk costs fallacy
- Coupled Confirmation Bias – my original concept (and its extension), which is only a hypothesis and requires further development and empirical validation.
- Tunnel vision, which is not a cognitive bias in itself, but a systemic mechanism.
The impact of cognitive biases on decision‑making — for example, in the context of reaching agreements — is the subject of extensive scientific research. Some of them are considered inhibiting, others reinforcing. This distinction is useful for drawing further conclusions.
Below I will present, in order:
- the mode of decision‑making in the Fogg model, and
- the parameters of a decision once it is made.
Only then will I show how selected cognitive biases can influence both whether we make a decision at all, and the content of that decision.
The Fogg Decision‑Making Model
The Fogg model describes human behavior as the result of three interacting components: motivation, ability, and a trigger. A behavior — including a decision — occurs only when all three appear at the same moment.
This means that even if a person wants to make a decision (motivation). And even if they can make it (ability), the decision will not happen without a trigger. Conversely, even a strong trigger will not work if motivation is too low or the action feels too difficult.
In practice, this model explains why people in conflict often remain stuck in indecision, delay key steps, or choose actions that are irrational from the outside. Their internal configuration of motivation, ability, and triggers is disrupted — and cognitive biases play a decisive role in that disruption.

Let us remember that, for a decision to occur, all three elements —
- motivation,
- ability, and
- trigger — must appear together. I have already discussed this in detail in a previous text.
Now I will pose a question:
What Is “Ability” in Fogg’s Framework?
I understand ability as a property whose characteristics are better captured by the word feasibility. I did not elaborate on this aspect in the previous article, so I will do it now.
In the Fogg model, feasibility — in my interpretation — is the resultant of two subjectively perceived factors:
- one’s own capabilities, and
- the difficulty of the task.
Only the decision‑maker’s perception matters. Of course, they may misjudge the situation due to a cognitive error or faulty data. Interestingly, such an error may ultimately lead to a beneficial decision.
Imagine that I have incomplete or inaccurate data. Acting under the influence of a logical or cognitive error, I draw incorrect conclusions from them. Those conclusions would be considered correct if I had access to complete or accurate data — and if I were not acting under the influence of error.
This can be summarized in one sentence: Fogg’s triad influences the act of decision‑making, which is not identical with the way the decision is executed. The manner of executing a previously made decision is described by decision parameters (discussed below).
What Are the 8 Types of Decisions?
I propose that decisions analyzed through the lens of their execution should be assigned three parameters. These parameters determine how the decision is carried out. The three decision parameters I propose below allow me to distinguish eight types of decisions.
In the following section, I present how each configuration combines to form these eight decision types. This is my original concept, which I find highly useful, though it naturally requires further testing. For now, it remains solely my own proposal, which I state explicitly.
My proposal of 3 Decision’s Parameters
The three decision’s parameters are: vector, dynamics, and determination (I am considering whether momentum might be a better term).
1. Vector
Its reference point is the current state. Its value is 0 or 1. Let 0 denote a tendency to remain in the existing arrangement, and 1 a drive toward change.
2. Dynamics
Let us distinguish two values of dynamics: (+) and (–), where (+) means that the decision results in action, and (–) means passivity.
3. Determination
Let us define two levels: (L) and (H), where (L) stands for low determination, and (H) stands for high determination.
Vector expresses the attitude toward the current state and its change. A decision to defend the status quo or to alter it may be realized — depending on circumstances — through passivity or action (dynamics + or –). Determination is a function of readiness to engage, which I understand as the resultant of:
- willingness to bear costs (financial, reputational, organizational, energetic, or even biological), and
- tolerance of risk.
Vector, dynamics, and determination form a simplified heuristic model created by me (at least I am not aware of any publications that use these parameters — apart from the previously mentioned inhibiting and reinforcing biases). Its usefulness certainly requires further research — for now, it remains a hypothetical model.
I also emphasize that the human psyche is not mathematics — yet paradoxically, mathematics allows us to understand the psyche better.
Table 1: The Three Decision’s Parameters
| Decision Parameter | Parameter Value | Description and Meaning of the Parameter |
|---|---|---|
| Vector | 0 | Indicates a tendency to maintain the current state. The decision‑maker interprets the situation as one in which it is better to remain with the status quo. |
| 1 | Indicates a drive to change the current state. The decision‑maker concludes that the existing arrangement requires modification or abandonment. | |
| Dynamics | + | A decision executed through action. It means actively doing something intended to maintain or change the state. |
| – | A decision executed through passivity. It means refraining from action as a way of achieving the goal (maintaining or changing the state). | |
| Determination | L | Low determination. Indicates limited willingness to bear costs and low risk tolerance. The decision is weak and easily altered. |
| H | High determination. Indicates a strong willingness to bear costs (financial, emotional, organizational, biological) and high risk tolerance. The decision is strong and stable. |
Using the three parameters listed above allows us to distinguish eight types of decisions.
Table 2: Eight Types of Decisions
| Decision Type No. | Vector | Dynamics | Determination | Description of the Decision | Example |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 0 | – | L | A decision to maintain the status quo through passivity with low determination | I decide to sleep a bit longer |
| 2 | 0 | – | H | A decision to maintain the status quo through non‑action with high determination | Sitting on a tree, I decide not to move so I don’t fall |
| 3 | 0 | + | L | A decision to maintain the status quo through action with low determination | I decide to shoo away the cat that is waking me up |
| 4 | 0 | + | H | A decision to maintain the status quo through action with high determination | I defend my daughter from an attacker |
| 5 | 1 | – | L | A decision to bring about change through passivity with low determination | I don’t water flowers I dislike so they will wither |
| 6 | 1 | – | H | A decision to bring about change through passivity with high determination | I decide not to save someone when I want them to drown |
| 7 | 1 | + | L | A decision to bring about change through action with low determination | I want to trim the cat’s claws |
| 8 | 1 | + | H | A decision to bring about change through action with high determination | I want to escape from prison |
Jakubiec eight types of decisions
Let us add that:
- decisions with vector 0 (maintaining the status quo), and
- decisions with negative dynamics (–), i.e., achieving the goal through passivity,
do not in any way mean the absence of a decision. These are not the same. I may decide to sit quietly and remain motionless so that someone does not find me. That decision is not the same as externally observed passivity caused, for example, by apathy or an ambivalent attitude toward the situation.
Similarly, it must be noted that:
- a decision aimed at change (Vector 1) cannot be equated with action (+), and
- a decision aimed at defending the status quo (Vector 0) cannot be equated with the absence of action.
The initial state (status quo) may be so desirable that we decide to defend it actively (vector 0, dynamics +). Thus, not wanting change, we will take action. Example: If I want a drowning person to survive, I will rescue them. Not wanting to allow a change (life → death), I will take action.
Conversely, it may happen that in striving for change we decide not to act. If I want a drowning person to die, it is enough that I do not rescue them. Drowning represents a change in their state (life → death) brought about by my passivity. Here we have vector 1, negative dynamics, and a level of determination which, in this example, we do not know — but we assume it would have to be very high.
For completeness, it must also be stated that the absence of a decision to change is not identical with a decision to maintain the status quo. A lack of decision results from the absence of at least one element of the decision triad (see above). Thus, the absence of a decision may result from a lack of motivation, a subjectively perceived lack of feasibility, or the absence of a trigger. This does not necessarily mean that the stimulus is irrelevant to us. It may, for example, generate motivation, but we will not make a decision because the task appears unfeasible. In such a situation, the objective absence of action cannot be equated with passivity as a chosen parameter of a made decision.
Example
When encountering a bear in the mountains, I may decide either to surrender or to save my life. But whether I achieve this by playing dead, fighting, or running — that is a parameter of the decision. And in this respect, it may be chosen correctly or incorrectly: I may run up a tree the bear can climb after me, or hide in a rock crevice where it cannot reach me. This does not change the fact that I decided to stay alive (vector 0) through action in the form of escape (dynamics +) or through passivity in the form of playing dead (dynamics –), with high determination in each case (H).
As I indicated above, one must distinguish between lying down because I consciously chose to survive by playing dead, and lying down because I concluded that I have no chance anyway, and besides, I have not wanted to live for a long time.
What Is the Relationship Between Cognitive Biases, the Decision Triad, and Decision Parameters?
Above, I outlined three areas: cognitive biases, the decision triad, and the decision parameters. A natural question arises: how can these elements relate to one another?
Let us begin with the clarification that there is no determinism here. Cognitive biases do not determine a given decision, but they significantly increase the tendency — they “pull” in a particular direction. I also note that one may simultaneously remain under the influence of two or more biases, originating from different sources, whose effects intersect at a given moment, each “pushing” the decision‑maker in a different (or the same) direction.
The Influence of Cognitive Biases on the Decision Triad (the Act of Making a Decision)
As indicated above, cognitive biases may act at every stage and level of decision‑making and decision execution. It may turn out that when the decision triad is activated, one bias becomes influential, and when setting the parameters of execution, we operate under the influence of another. It may also happen that two biases act simultaneously, and their mutual relationship is positive (they act in the same direction), partially opposing, or entirely opposing. Most often, however, we will remain under the influence of one of them.
Let us assume that cognitive biases may influence:
- the emergence of motivation by affecting the evaluation of the stimulus that generates emotion, and consequently the direction or strength of motivation;
- the subjective assessment of feasibility;
- susceptibility to a trigger.
Let us also assume that, with respect to each element of the decision triad, the influence of a cognitive bias may be reinforcing or weakening.
Motivation
A cognitive bias may influence the very existence of motivation (trigger it or extinguish it), and may strengthen or weaken existing motivation.
Perception of Feasibility
A cognitive bias may influence the assessment of feasibility and make the sense of feasibility stronger or weaker (both by affecting the perception of one’s own capabilities and the subjectively perceived difficulty of the task itself).
A distorted assessment caused by a cognitive bias may therefore result in:
- evaluating a task as feasible when it is not feasible;
- evaluating a task as unfeasible when it is feasible.
and consequently:
- making a decision when the goal is “desirable” but objectively unattainable (lack of feasibility);
- not making a decision when the goal is objectively attainable and desirable.
Trigger
With respect to the trigger, a cognitive bias may strengthen or weaken its effect. This means that, at a sufficient intensity of cognitive distortion:
- certain cognitive biases may interpret as a trigger a factor that, under other circumstances, would not be interpreted that way;
- an objectively strong trigger may turn out to be too weak, even though it would be sufficient to make a decision if the bias of that type and intensity were not present;
- an objectively weak trigger may turn out to be strong enough to make a decision, even though without the presence of a bias of that type and intensity, it would not be sufficient.
To illustrate this, I will use a table showing the possible influence of selected cognitive biases on a chosen element of the decision triad — feasibility.
Table 3: Influence of Selected Cognitive Biases on the Perception of Task Feasibility in the Fogg Model
| Cognitive Bias | How It Distorts the Perception of Feasibility | Consequences for Making a Decision About Change in the Fogg Model |
|---|---|---|
| Confirmation bias | Reinforces the belief that previous actions were correct | May result in a decision to change / or no decision to change |
| Fundamental Attribution Error | Explains the other party’s stance by attributing it to presumed internal traits (e.g., character traits) | May result in a decision to change / or no decision to change |
| Feedback loop | Strengthens initial assumptions, leading to radicalization | May result in a decision to change / or no decision to change |
| Coupled Confirmation Bias | Leads to radicalization and escalation | Results in a decision to change |
| Status quo bias | Leads to a desire to maintain the current state (status quo) | Results in no decision to change |
| Sunk cost fallacy | Leads to a desire to maintain the current state (status quo) and deepen it | Results in no decision to change |
| Hyper‑usefulness bias (AI) | Strengthens initial assumptions, which may lead to radicalization | May result in a decision to change / or no decision to change |
The Influence of Cognitive Biases on Decision Parameters
A cognitive bias may — independently of its earlier influence on the very act of making a decision according to the Fogg model — appear and exert its effect at the next stage, i.e., when setting the parameters for executing the decision.
Thus, it may influence the vector of the decision and result in our reacting to a given stimulus by making an incorrect decision about maintaining or changing the current state. Example: the radio is playing too loudly. I decide to remove the inconsistency between the volume of the music and my well‑being. A cognitive bias may cause me, instead of adjusting the radio to myself — lowering the volume or turning it off (vector 1, dynamics +, determination L) — to try to “get used to it” (vector 1, dynamics –, determination L).
A cognitive bias may influence the dynamics of the decision and result in my choosing action instead of non‑action incorrectly, after having already set the vector (my stance toward the current state). Example: during a trek, my leg hurts. I want to eliminate the pain (vector 1 — change of the current state). But under the influence of a cognitive bias, I incorrectly choose the dynamics and opt for activity (walking off the pain) instead of passivity (stopping and resting).
Cognitive biases may likewise influence determination, increasing or weakening it. This results in greater engagement and greater willingness to take risks than would follow from a rational assessment. Example: a poorly managed company is generating losses, and my business partner once again asks me to contribute a significant amount of money. A cognitive bias in the form of the sunk cost fallacy may increase my determination to invest more (vector 0 — decision to stay, dynamics + in the form of contributing more funds), causing me to invest more than I would if I were not under the influence of this bias.
As we can see, cognitive biases may independently affect each element of the decision triad and each of the decision parameters.
The Operation of a Cognitive Bias and Its Possible Consequences
I understand the decision‑making process as follows:
- first, there is a stimulus;
- then, the decision triad results in making a decision or not making a decision;
- next, the decision parameters are selected, which serve the function of executing the decision.
I emphasize that the choice of decision parameters may be correct or incorrect (like running up a tree to escape a bear). They are merely tools — ways of executing a decision whose source lies in motivation. Whether we correctly perform the fundamental reasoning — choosing the method of achieving the goal — depends on us or on external factors.
In legal practice, I often see how frequently people make serious errors here: they want to achieve something, but they use tools that cannot bring them closer to the goal. Or they use the right tools incorrectly.
The errors we may commit when setting decision parameters can be divided into:
- choosing a tool that under no circumstances serves the achievement of the given goal;
- choosing a tool that, under these circumstances, is not suitable for achieving the intended goal;
- incorrect use of a correctly chosen tool:
- regarding the method,
- regarding the direction.
Let us note that cognitive biases may influence the final shape of our decision at every stage of its formation:
- the emergence of motivation;
- the assessment of feasibility;
- susceptibility to a trigger;
- the setting of the parameters for executing the decision.
How Can a Specific Cognitive Bias Distort Decisions?
Let us now examine how certain cognitive biases may influence:
- the act of making a decision (Fogg’s decision triad), and
- the parameters of that decision: vector, dynamics, and determination.
I do not have space here to show all possible variants: the influence of every identified bias on each element of the decision triad and each element of the decision parameters. Nor do I have space to show the influence of “clusters of cognitive biases” operating simultaneously or sequentially.
What I can do within this article is show how one bias affects the decision‑making process. I will therefore use confirmation bias.
As a starting point, we must of course assume the most probable decision that would be made if the bias were not present.
The Influence of Confirmation Bias on Individual Elements of the Decision Process
Let us use the example described earlier — encountering a bear in the mountains.
My biological sensors detect danger → motivation to preserve life arises → I assess the task as feasible → the trigger is the assessment that a short time window appears in which I have a chance, but I must act now → I make the decision that I want to stay alive (vector 0) → as the tool (in this case) I choose playing dead (passivity, dynamics –) → my determination is very high (H).
This determination is very interesting in this example. It manifests in my tolerance for costs — the bear may scratch me, test me, even step on me, but I decide to remain in an uncomfortable situation (one I am not accustomed to), in which I suffer successive losses and injuries, for as long as necessary.
How can confirmation bias operate in such a situation? Recall that it consists in seeking confirmation of the correctness of a previously made decision and attributing confirmatory value to factors that do not logically carry it.
The influence of this bias may be presented in the following table.
Table 4: The Influence of Confirmation Bias on the Decision‑Making Process
| Stage of the Decision Process | Element | Influence of Confirmation Bias: Reinforcement or Weakening | Effect |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fogg Triad | Motivation | ↑ or ↓ | We become inclined to maintain the previously chosen course |
| Feasibility | ↑ or ↓ | The perception of feasibility becomes distorted. The direction depends on whether the analyzed action aligns with the previously chosen course | |
| Trigger | ↑ or ↓ | We may become over‑reactive or, conversely, fail to react to triggers that we would respond to if the bias were absent | |
| Decision Parameters | Vector (0/1) | — | The vector becomes confirmed |
| Dynamics (+/–) | — | The chosen dynamics becomes reinforced | |
| Determination (L/H) | — | Determination increases to an irrational level |
The Influence of Various Cognitive Biases on a Selected Element of the Decision Process
As mentioned above, each cognitive bias may act on each element of the decision process (individually or in selected combinations). Above, I showed how a single cognitive bias — confirmation bias — affects the entire decision‑making process. Now I will show how each cognitive bias may act on a selected element of the decision process. Let that element be the vector of the decision. For simplicity, I will remain with the familiar example of the bear encounter.
Table 5: Influence of Selected Cognitive Biases on the Decision Vector (Using the Bear Encounter Example)
| Cognitive Bias | How It Distorts the Assessment of the Situation | Influence on the Decision Vector (0 = status quo / 1 = change) | Bear Example |
|---|---|---|---|
| Confirmation bias | Strengthens earlier assumptions and interpretations | May reinforce vector 0 or 1 depending on the prior narrative | Wanting to survive, I may engage in wishful thinking and see opportunities where none exist, just to maintain hope |
| Fundamental Attribution Error | Attributes the bear’s behavior to its “bad intentions” rather than the situation | May reinforce vector 0 or 1 depending on the prior narrative | I assume the bear “will definitely attack me,” even though it is only observing me → I start running, which provokes it to chase me |
| Status quo bias | Overestimates the safety of the current state | Pushes toward vector 0 | I remain motionless even though the bear has noticed me and the situation requires change |
| Sunk cost fallacy | Strengthens attachment to the previous strategy | Reinforces vector 0 or 1 depending on the situation | “Since I’ve already endured so long pretending to be dead, I must endure longer” — even though the situation is worsening because the bear is sitting on me and I may suffocate |
| Coupled Confirmation Bias | Does not occur because the bear does not use AI (for now) | Does not apply | Does not apply |
| Tunnel vision | Narrows perception to one aspect of the situation | Strengthens the chosen vector | I climbed a tree and feel relieved that I saved my life. I suppress the fact that bears climb trees very well and will be up here shortly |
| Feedback loop | Strengthens the initial interpretation through successive stimuli | Reinforces vector 1 or 0, usually toward escalation | I sit in the tree and call a friend who tells me it was a great idea. My conviction is reinforced — at least until the bear gets hungry enough to come after me |
| Hyper‑usefulness bias | Overestimates the accuracy of earlier “suggestions” or heuristics | Vector is set according to the earlier “suggestion,” not the real situation | If, sitting in the tree, I ask AI whether I made the right choice, and my digital assistant replies: “Andrzej, that was an excellent decision…” I may become so confident that I start provoking the bear |
The Influence of Cognitive Biases on Decision‑Making and Decision Parameters. Summary
An attempt to analyze the operation of individual cognitive biases allows us to cautiously draw the conclusion that some of them tend to influence specific decision parameters in characteristic ways. As an example, I will use a two‑dimensional chart that includes only vector and dynamics, but does not include determination (this would require a three‑dimensional chart). We can see that some biases are more likely to “pull” a given parameter in a particular direction, while others may have no influence on, for example, dynamics, but will influence the vector. This can be cautiously presented in the following way.

Let us remember one thing from this. To err is human. We all make mistakes, constantly. Some of the causes of our errors are within our control; others are not. Cognitive biases have the particular feature of operating covertly, exerting a very strong influence on how we perceive reality. They pull us in like quicksand and can cause us to lose contact with reality.
The easiest way to protect ourselves from them is by learning about them, studying them, and checking the logic of our thinking. If we know them, we will learn to detect them — and that will protect us from many extremely costly mistakes.
